A Look Back Into 1973

Editors Note: Following is an abridged version of a letter from Haskell B. Wilson (better known as “Hack”), Technical Director of the Naval Weapons Center, to Vice Admiral William J. Moran, then serving as the Director of Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation in OPNAV. Moran had previously served as the Commander, NWC, as a Rear Admiral, and earlier as the Technical Officer. As the NWC Technical Officer he influenced the initiation of the early development of the SHRIKE missile system based on his operational experience and recognition of the need for an anti-radar weapon. The letter is dated 12 April 1973, just prior to Wilson’s retirement.

-Paul B. Homer

Vice Admiral William J. Moran

Director, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

Dear Bill:

The time has come! After 30 years in naval ordnance I am getting ready to be piped ashore, or whatever is customary for battered and waning civilians. As I recall, you asked that in my “final hour” I bequeath you any trade secrets I might have on the management of NWC and R&D labs in general. In lieu of any pro-found and hidden knowledge I hereby will to you my attempt at an equation for the successful management of ordnance R&D laboratories. You will recognize the ideas as borrowed, plagiarized, or in other ways stolen from you and all the others who have contributed to the NWC philosophy.

This equation for effective ordnance is as follows:

The nomenclature is thus:

O = Ordnance effectiveness

Po = Other resources involving people

Rp = Physical resources to carry a weapon idea from inception to development of experimental hardware and on through testing

Rf = Financial resources to do the job

E = Creative environment for stimulating and supporting new approach thinking

Ml = Management resistance, local

Mw = Management resistance, Washington

In essence the equation shows the value of getting the proper mix of people together in a creative environment with the proper resources. The importance of this relationship eluded the Navy, as far as ordnance was concerned, from the Revolutionary War until World War II. Except in times of war, civilian scientists and engineers were generally dealt out, either by not being invited to play the game or because they didn’t want in. There were exceptions, like contracts with Robert Goddard, Elmer Sperry and Carl Norden. And there was a handful of professionals like George Patterson at Indian Head and our own L. T. E. Thompson at Dahlgren. But for the most part it took the mass mobilization of science under Vannevar Bush in the World War II Office of Scientific Research and Development to really demonstrate what could be done when you got top-flight scientists working on military problems.

NWC lucked out. It was born during the high-g acceleration of World War II scientific mobilization. The founders of NWC were part of spectacular work being done each day on rockets, radar, sonar, fire control, proximity fuzes, and the A-bomb. All of this work proved the soundness of the equation I am sharing with you. The importance of the relationships expressed in the equation was recognized at the time by Navy leaders like Admirals William Blandy and “Deak” Parsons, who were determined to start building a permanent laboratory system while the wartime resources and insight were still present. They applied the equation to the peacetime Navy that had been proven so effective in war.

To understand the ups and downs we need to look a little closer at the elements of the equation.

Let’s look at Pc. Many factors affect the quality of the civilian staff of scientists and engineers. The quality of Pm, for example, affects Pc. The higher the level of civilian scientists, the louder the call for scientific freedom and the greater the concern over military controls on how the technical work is done. Thanks to the qualifications and personalities of most of the commanders we have had at NWC, this factor affects Pc less today than it did immediately following World War II. Other factors which affect Pc are Navy personnel policies and civil service regulations. These have not always been conducive to getting the best people, but there has been growing recognition that laboratories are not shipyards. However, there are new problems. Requirements for bringing down grade levels, for example, when they are suddenly and arbitrarily imposed, can wreck many years of work in building a responsive staff with high morale. National attitudes toward weaponry affect incoming Pc. This could become a growing problem as we move, which seems to be the case, back into the post-World War I “Merchants of Death” cycle. But it seems to me, Bill, if we want to keep Pc high, we should remember the words of Michelson, “If you want to keep a first-class physicist like Michelson, you must treat him like a first-class physicist.” And that I think applies to all kinds of specialists.

In reviewing the roles of the naval officers and civilian scientists and engineers it is important not to underestimate the importance of all of the other people-type resources necessary to keep a laboratory going the support personnel, the important services obtained through contracts, and the enlisted personnel who keep our aircraft flying and perform other valuable services. One way to increase the positive effort of the Po factor in the equation is to give more recognition to people at all levels for what they contribute.

As to Rp and Rf, this Center lucked out again. It inherited an ideal location and a good set of facilities at the end of World War II. Quite as important, a building program aimed at providing a permanent R&D center was under way while the wartime momentum still existed. But in time the momentum was lost. For the last 10 years at least we have not kept pace in facilities and equipment. The total environment for getting support for R&D resources of the capital type has been and continues to be somewhat negative. Reversing this will be of utmost importance to NWC, the Navy, and the Nation.

E, or creative environment, is a positive result of management, from both the local and Washington levels, and is enhanced by healthy combinations of Pc, Pm, Po, and R. This factor will be high as long as the leadership style is in the direction of motivation, persuasion, freedom of action (but with accountability), and major delegation (as opposed to command or detailed direction and control). By creative environment I am not suggesting a relaxed “academic” atmosphere without a reasonable level of time/performance pressure.

On the other hand, it is unlikely that the best ideas and work will come out of an overly pressurized environment, at least not for long. It is hard to hire or keep the creative scientist or engineer who feels he cannot keep abreast of the state of the art because the organization is wound too tight by overactive flap-generating functions.

Ml and Mw, or management resistance, as opposed to E, are negative results of management, local and Washington. In this equation, Ml and Mw reduce the end result of effective ordnance. To cut down the resistance represented by Ml and Mw, management should integrate Pc, Pm, and Po into an effective and productive weapons development team. Management should allocate Rp and Rf. It should set the direction. It should provide the technical support to production managers and to Fleet users.

Bill, you now have the equation, which you will soon observe is merely another way of presenting fundamentals you have been applying all along. But while we are on the subject of R&D management, let me toss in a few more thoughts relative to NWC in particular.

Most important to the effective functioning of NWC is to have a balanced RDT&E program including mission analysis and understanding of the tactical problem, economic analysis determining budgetary feasibility of weapons systems, intelligence inputs on the opposition’s weapon technology, research in areas with potential weapon application, applied research in the principal hardware for the Fleet, liaison with industry during transition of weapons from development to production, technical support during production, technical support to the Fleet user, and quick response to critical Fleet needs.

As to the future of NWC, let me say that if it is to meet the challenges ahead, it must continue with its willingness to experiment and to change. Its legacy from the past put it in good stead. As I see it, its major strengths for dealing with the future are:

1. An inherent innovative approach in searching for practical and economical solutions to Fleet needs

2. A closely knit military/civilian team with expertise on Fleet requirements and methods of science and technology

3. A reputation of leadership, backed up by 30 years of achievement in doing things well and quickly

4. A willingness to experiment and to take risks without inordinate worry about failure

5. An ability to propose and to do what is thought to be needed, instead of being passive and only reactive

6. An ethic of responsibility toward the customers

7. Tolerances for ambiguity, and willingness to roll with the punches

8. The talents and physical resources for doing the whole R&D job

We are working on our problems as best we know how. I am confident that time and patience will give us the answers to many of them. In the other instances we will do what can be done.

As a final comment, we are the result of what we have been but we can never be what we have been. The evolution of NWC continues, and I believe, on an upward vector.

Most cordially,

signed “Hack”

H. G. Wilson